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1. Introduction
Certain nouns like temperature and mayor seem to be systematically ambiguous
between a function and a value reading. On the one hand, they can refer to a func-
tion that tells us for each moment of time what the temperature of a particular place
is or who the mayor of a particular city is. On the other hand, they can refer to an
individual which constitutes the actual value of the aforementioned function. The
temperature paradox (attributed to Barbara Partee) evidences this difference: The
subject position of an intensional verb like rise requires reference not only to the
actual index, but also a temporal interval around it; that is, it appeals to the function.
The second sentence speciﬁes the actual value, to which properties of the function
need not apply. (1) thus constitutes an invalid inference.1
(1) The temperature is rising.
The temperature is ninety.
Ninety is rising.
Lo¨bner (1981) gives somewhat more natural examples of such fallacies with tem-
peratures (cf. 2) and mayors (cf. 3).2
(2) Right now, the temperature of the air in my refrigerator is the same as the
temperature of the air in your refrigerator.
The temperature of the air in my refrigerator is rising.
The temperature of the air in your refrigerator is rising.
(3) The mayor of Frankfurt is Petra Roth.
The mayor could have changed last January.
Petra Roth could have changed last January.
How should we account for this dual role of referring to functions or their values?
For many helpful comments I would like to thank the audiences of SALT XVI as well as of
Semantiknetzwerk 6, DIP Amsterdam, GK Stuttgart, and Semantikzirkel Frankfurt.
1ninety is taken to abbreviate ninety degrees Fahrenheit and to refer to an abstract degree indi-
vidual which can also be picked out by 32 degrees Celsius.
2Note that the last sentence of (3) also has a reading of partial change under which the individual
picked out by the proper name Petra Roth changes with respect to a particular property, cf. Lo¨bner
(1979). In this paper, I focus exclusively on the reading where different individuals are picked out
before and after the change.
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2. Individual Concepts from the Lexicon
2.1. The Montagovian Solution
The classical solution to the temperature paradox is given in Montague (1974)
(PTQ). He assumes that, at an index, common nouns denote not just sets of individ-
uals, 〈e, t〉, but rather sets of individual concepts, that is, of functions from indices
to individuals.3 Common nouns thus have 〈〈s,e〉, t〉-denotations. The model con-
tains an abstract degree individual picked out by the type e-constant 90F, ninety
(degrees Fahrenheit) is translated as λP.P (w,t)(λ(w,t).90F), the translates as
Russellian quantiﬁer, be as extensional identity:
(4) the ≡ λP 〈〈s,e〉,t〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉.∃x[∀y[P (y) ↔ y = x] ∧ Q(x)]
(5) be ≡ λP〈s,〈s,〈〈s,e〉,t〉〉〉λx〈s,e〉.P(w,t)(λ(w,t)λy.x(w,t) = y(w,t))
The PTQ-translation of the classical temperature paradox thus looks like (6):
(6) a. ∃x[∀y[temperature(w,t)(y) ↔ x = y] ∧ rise(w,t)(x)]
b. ∃x[∀y[temperature(w,t)(y) ↔ x = y]∧x(w,t) = 90F]
c. rise(w,t)(λ(w,t).90F)
It is easy to see that rising can be a property of the unique individual concept de-
scribing the salient temperature, but not of the individual picked out by the constant
90F or the constant individual concept λ(w,t).90F . Thus, a solution to the tem-
perature paradox is obtained.
2.2. A Problem for the Montagovian Solution
Dowty et al. (1981) discuss in some detail a problem for the Montagovian solution
pointed out by Anil Gupta.4
(7) Necessarily, the temperature of the air in my refrigerator is always the same
as the temperature of the air in your refrigerator.
The temperature of the air in my refrigerator is rising.
The temperature of the air in your refrigerator is rising.
Intuitively, (7) is valid. However, given the translations obtained from the PTQ-
framework (cf. 8) and the interpretation of rise (cf. 9) it is predicted to be invalid.
3Throughout this paper, I translate LFs to a variant of Ty2: e the type of individuals, t the type
of truth values, s the type of indices, which consist of a world and a time component. Interpretation
[[ · ]] proceeds with respect to a standard model M and an assignment g, reference to which is mostly
ignored for simplicity. Section 4.1 adds a further parameter F .
4(7) is a recast from Lo¨bner (1981). Following Romero (2006), I insert always to ensure the
habitual reading crucial for validity of the inference. She shows that syntactic decomposition into
quantiﬁcation over worlds and times already avoids many mispredictions; yet, certain syntactic as-
sumptions or a meaning postulate are needed in addition.
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(8) a. ∀(w,t)∃x[∀y[temperature-in-my-refrigerator(w,t)(y) ↔ x = y] ∧
∃z[∀y[temperature-in-your-refrigerator(w,t)(y) ↔ z = y] ∧
x(w,t) = z(w,t)]]
b. ∃x[∀y[temperature-in-my-refrigerator(w,t)(y)↔x = y]∧ rise(w,t)(x)]
c. ∃x[∀y[temperature-in-your-refrigerator(w,t)(y)↔ x = y]∧ rise(w,t)(x)]
(9) [[rise]](w,t)(f 〈s,e〉) = 1 iff there is an interval T that includes t and for all
t′, t′′ in T : if t′ < t′′, then f(w,t′) < f(w,t′′).
To see the failure, we consider a model M with one world w, three temporal instants
t1, t2, t3 and the interpretation of the constants corresponding to Figure 2.2.
(10) [[temp-in-my-ref]](w,t1) = {M1}, [[temp-in-my-ref]](w,t2) = {M2}, . . . ,
[[temp-in-your-ref]](w,t1) = {Y 3}
(11) M1 = {〈(w,t1),15〉,〈(w,t2),12〉,〈(w,t3),8〉},
M2 = {〈(w,t1),12.5〉,〈(w,t2),25〉,〈(w,t3),30〉},. . . ,
Y 3 = {〈(w,t1),5〉,〈(w,t2),10〉,〈(w,t3),20〉}
t1 t2 t3 time
degree
M1
Y2
M3
Y3
Y1
M2
10
20
30
Figure 1: Graphical representation of the counter-model M .
(8a) is true because at each index the two functions picked out there as describing
the temperatures in your and my refrigerator respectively assign the same value to
that index. Moreover, at t2, the function selected as describing the temperature
in my refrigerator (M2) is rising (so, 8b is true). Nevertheless, the one that in t2
describes the temperature of your refrigerator (Y 2) is falling (so, 8c is false).
At this point, the problem with the Montagovian solution is quite obvious:
by employing constants of type 〈s,〈〈s,e〉, t〉〉, we have doubled the index depen-
dence of temperature: At a ﬁxed index, it denotes a set of functions that assign
(degree-)individuals to indices (individual concepts); I call this the inner index
dependence (IID). At the same time, it can denote different such sets at different
indices; I call this the outer index dependence (OID).
To get around this surplus of variation that is responsible for the failure of
intuitively valid inferences like (7), various strategies are conceivable: (i) a meaning
postulate (= give up OID), (ii) intensions of Fregean deﬁnite descriptions (Laser-
sohn 2005) (= give up IID), (iii) conceptual covers (OID = semantics, IID = prag-
matics), (iv) intensional identity (a stronger version of be), or (v) type shifts from
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index dependent sets of individuals/pairs to index independent sets of individual
concepts (explored brieﬂy in Schwager 2006; in detail in Nathan 2005).
The easiest solution (and most likely the one Montague himself would have
gone for), is to employ a Meaning Postulate along the lines of (12). This ensures
triviality of the outer index dependence and thus validity of (7).5
(12) ∀x∀(w,t)[α(w,t)(x)→ ∀(w,t)[α(w,t)(x)]], for α = temperature, price,. . .
Romero (2006) shows that under a more careful treatment of quantiﬁcation over
worlds and times and with attention to the difference between habitual and acciden-
tal identity even a weaker meaning postulate against variation over time within one
world is sufﬁcient. Still, as long as we need meaning postulates to avoid mispre-
dictions w.r.t. functions and their values, I think we should worry about whether
our analysis misses some deeper connection between them.6 Moreover, in Section
3.4, I will discuss a problem that does not ﬁnd a straightforward-solution in terms
of individual concepts coming from the lexicon. In this paper, I focus exclusively
on the alternatives (ii) and (iii). I ignore the possibility to render the copula am-
biguous (it generates too many inaccurate readings). In contrast, the alternative in
terms of type-shifts as proposed by Nathan (2005) deserves careful comparison that
is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. Deriving Individual Concepts in the Course of the Derivation
3.1. Lasersohn: Intensions of Fregean Deﬁnite Descriptions
According to Lasersohn (2005), outer index dependence is just the natural depen-
dence of common nouns on the index of evaluation, and should thus be kept. But he
considers inner index dependence to be forced by Montague’s Russellian treatment
of the (repeated in 13). Since some predicates (e.g. rise) require an argument of
type 〈s,e〉, the restrictor has to be of the same type. Hence, at an index, temperature
gets interpreted as a set of individual concepts instead of individuals.
(13) the ≡ λP 〈〈s,e〉,t〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉.∃x[∀y[P (y) ↔ y = x] ∧ Q(x)]
5Note that Lasersohn’s (2005) version sketched in (12) fails to take into account the implicit
argument. Therefore, (5) is still not predicted to be valid:
(i) At all worlds and times, the temperature of Ce´cile’s refrigerator not of my refrigerator, is the
same as the temperature of Ede’s refrigerator.
The temperature of the Ce´cile’s refrigerator is rising.
intuitively ⇒; Montague+MP(12) predict ⇒
The temperature of Ede’s refrigerator is rising.
Assume that at all indices, the individual concept c records the temperature of Ce´cile’s refrigerator,
and apart from (w,t), the temperature of Ede’s refrigerator is recorded by xede , and the one of mine
by xm (so both are still temperatures). At (w,t), xm and xede are exchanged, but xm(w,t) = c(w,t).
Even if the premises and (12) are true, the consequence need not be.
6Cf. Zimmermann (1999) for more general discussion of the status of meaning postulates.
Bodyguards under Cover: the Status of Individual Concepts 249
Lasersohn then argues that a Fregean treatment of deﬁnite descriptions (cf. 14) al-
lows for an interesting alternative to capture the function/value ambiguity: let tem-
perature denote a set of individuals at each index, that is, temperature starts out as
‘actual temperature value’. Zooming in on a salient location/object, this is a sin-
gleton set. Therefore, uniqueness and existence presupposition of ι are met and the
deﬁnite description the temperature is felicitous. To talk about the development of
the salient object’s temperature throughout time, we use the intension of the Fregean
deﬁnite description. This is exactly the function that assigns each index the unique
temperature value at that index, hence, an individual concept.
(14) the ≡ λP 〈s,〈e,t〉〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉.Q(λ(w,t).ιu[P (w,t)(u)])
(15) [[ιuφ]]g is the unique object d such that [[φ ]]g[u/d] = 1
if such an object d exists; undeﬁned otherwise.
At all indices, λ(w,t).ιu[temperature(w,t)(u)] denotes the same function that
picks out the temperature at each index. With temperature as a constant of type
〈s,〈e, t〉〉, and rise untouched (type 〈〈s,e〉, t〉),we obtain the following transla-
tions of the temperature-paradox and the my/your refrigerator puzzle:
(16) a. rise(w,t)(λ(w,t).ιu[temperature(w,t)(u)])
b. ιu[temperature(w,t)(u)] = 90F
c. rise(w,t)(λ(w,t).90F)
(17) a. ∀(w,t)[ιu[temp-in-my-ref(w,t)(u) = ιu[temp-in-your-ref(w,t)(u)]]
b. rise(λ(w,t).ιu[temp-in-my-ref(w,t)(u)])
c. rise(w,t)(λ(w,t).ιu[temp-in-your-ref(w,t)(u)])
Eventually, the translations of both temperature-paradox and temperature-price puz-
zle look satisfactory. The unintuitive multiplicity of temperature functions in the
world has been removed. In addition, the types have been simpliﬁed considerably.
3.2. When Uniqueness Fails
Nevertheless, Lasersohn’s solution faces a big problem. temperature is an inher-
ently functional concept, hence, temperature as temperature at the salient location,
will always denote a singleton set and thus never appear as the restrictor of a gen-
eralized quantiﬁer (other than Russellian the). But if the temperatures of different
locations/objects are under consideration as e.g. in the context of a weather sta-
tion that monitors different citites, examples like (18) are fully natural. Romero
(2006) considers this decisive to abandon Lasersohn’s idea in favour of improving
Montague’s solution in terms of 〈〈s,e〉, t〉-extensions, backing it up with a careful
distinction between accidental and habitual identity as well as a meaning postulate.
(18) Every temperature is rising.
Since Lasersohn blames the uniform type assignment to restrictor and nuclear scope
as the origin of inner index dependence, one could try to avoid it for quantiﬁers like
every. But neither (19a) nor (19b) are viable.
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(19) a. λP 〈e,t〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉∀ue[P (u) → Q(λ(w,t).u)]
b. λP 〈e,t〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉∀x〈s,e〉[P (x(w,t)) → Q(x)]
Quantiﬁcation over actual temperature values and predicating rise of their intension
as in (19a) fails because λ(w,t).u is constant for any u of type e. (19b) quantiﬁes
over all individual concepts whose value is (also) a temperature at the given index.
This does not give the desired solution either. If the abstract degree individual 90F
occurs as a temperature at an index (w,t), any function f with f(w,t) = 90F would
have to be rising. But one can always ﬁnd an individual concept to falsify this.7
However, I do not want to give up too quickly on Lasersohn’s intuition that one can
somehow extract functions from actual values. To extend his solution to examples
like (18), the ﬁrst step is to take seriously the relational (ultimately, functional)
character of temperature: temperature really means temperature of an object/at a
location. In 3.3, I investigate a way to make use of this in the course of the semantic
derivation, in 3.4 I show two cases where it fails. I will then take a second step and
argue that the individual concepts are not derived in the course of the semantic
derivation, but are part of how we individuate individuals. That is, they come in at
a pragmatic level only. This retains Lasersohn’s insight that values are primary and
functions are derived, but it deviates from his solution in deriving the functions at a
different level.
3.3. Extending Lasersohn by Quantifying over Implict Arguments in Semantics
If we take into account that temperature is really a functional noun, we obtain a
natural interpretation for (18) (repeated as 20) by quantifying over the implicit ar-
gument:
(20) Every temperature is rising.
every object x is such that the temperature of x is rising
Generally, quantiﬁers seem to be able to bind implicit arguments (cf. Partee 1989).
Evidence comes from examples like (21):
(21) Every farmer knows a neighbour.
(preferred reading: Every farmer knows a neighbour of his.)
To extend Lasersohn’s solution to examples like (18), I translate temperature as
temperature(w,t) of type 〈e,〈e, t〉〉. Before it combines with the deﬁnite article,
its ﬁrst argument has to be saturated (e.g. by a free variable present in the syntax).
The quantiﬁcational determiners every, most,. . . are taken to be ambiguous; when
they are to combine with a relational noun the ﬁrst argument of which has not been
saturated, the versions in (22) are used.
7E.g. assume 90F is the temperature value of Frankfurt at (w,t). Then, another individual
concept f tm with the same value is the mirror temperature at t of Frankfurt deﬁned as in (i).
(i) for any world w: f tm(w,t) = f(w,t), and any amount of time n, f tm(w,t+n) = f(w,t−n)
Now, at any index either the temperature in Frankfurt f is falling, or f tm is falling, or both are
constant.
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(22) every2 translates into
λP 〈s,〈e,〈e,t〉〉〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉.∀u[C(u) → Q(λ(w,t).ιv[P (w,t)(u)(v)])]
most2 translates into
λP 〈s,〈e,〈e,t〉〉〉λQ〈〈s,e〉,t〉.most(λu.C(u))(λu.Q(λ(w,t).ιv[P (w,t)(u)(v)]))
E.g. (23a) is now translated as (23b). It is interpreted to be true iff for most contex-
tually relevant objects u it is the case that the function constituted by the intension
of the unique temperature of u is rising.
(23) a. Most temperatures are rising.
b. most(λu.C(u))(λu.rise(w,t)(λ(w,t).ιv[temperature(w,t)(u)(v)]))
When quantifying over implicit arguments we should be on guard for the proportion
problem, though.8 Consider (24a). Given that mother need not correspond to an
injective function (two children can have the same mother), it is crucial that, rather
than counting children, we count people who are mother of someone.9
(24) a. Most mothers love their children.
b. Most children’s mothers love them.
Now, temperature is clearly not injective on the value reading, but things are less
clear on the function reading. In principle, it does not seem to be impossible that
two objects have the same temperature at all worlds and times. Nevertheless, it is
hard to tell if that should count as involving one or two temperatures for sentences
like (23a). The analysis developed in this subsection amounts to counting two nec-
essarily identical temperatures twice. Although intuitions are very weak, this seems
to be quite acurate for (23a). Nevertheless, in the case of two cities sharing the same
person as a mayor at all worlds and times, intuitions are rather that (on the function
reading) this should count as one mayor only.
As it stands, the ambiguity in quantiﬁcational determiners overgenerates
quite a bit: not only do we make the wrong predictions for non-classical quantiﬁ-
cation over non-injective functional nouns like mother, we also have to ban appli-
cation to properly relational nouns. For (25a), more than one senator per state does
not lead to a presupposition failure (and again, we do not want to count states).
The desired reading is obtained by ﬁrst turning the relational noun into a sortal one
by anaphoric interpretation of the implicit argument or by existential closure (as in
8Possessive constructions as discussed by Barker (1995) differ in that respect:
(i) Most students’ papers are too long.
For most students x: x’s papers are too long.
Thanks to the maximalization inherent in the possessive construction, quantiﬁcation over extracted
possessors (inverse linking) gives rise to the correct reading.
9The issue does not arise in classical quantiﬁcation like (ia) which Lo¨bner (1985) suggests to
analyze as (ib):
(i) a. Every mother loves her child.
b. Every child’s mother loves that child.
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25b). We can then apply ordinary quantiﬁcation over individuals that are senators
of some state.
(25) a. Every senator was late.
b. Every x such that there is a state y and x is senator from y was late.
So, we are not absolutely sure if we would always count the right objects (intension-
ally equivalent temperatures), and there is still some overgeneration to be banned
by restricting the solution to a proper sub-class of functional nouns.10 Still, implicit
quantiﬁcation carries some promise for nouns like temperature. In the following
section I will discuss two cases that the approach fails to extend to.
3.4. Two Types of Properly Relational Nouns
The real problem for an extension of the Lasersohn-style solution comes from the
fact that not all nouns in subject position of rise are functional. Hence, even if we
quantify over the implicit argument, the individual concept obtained as the intension
corresponding to the deﬁnite counterpart of the common noun phrase hidden in the
syntactic subject is always undeﬁned.
On the one hand, we ﬁnd nouns that seem to describe sets of functions
(and their respective values) at a given index. Lo¨bner (1979) dubs them funktio-
nenbu¨ndel (bundle of functions).
(26) a. One value (of patient Smith) is rising.
b. Two of his critical values are rising.
Here, we do not want to count patients, but for a given patient (Smith) the number
of functions that count as his critical values at that index and are rising. For the
sentences to be true there need not be (and, for 26b there certainly cannot be) a
unique critical value of Smith. Intuitively, one would want to somehow stick in
the different roles various critical values have with respect to Smith (one being his
(unique) blood pressure, one his (unique) concentration of cholesterol,. . . ). If this
could be smuggled into the semantics, something like (27) might result. While
meeting our intuitions for (26b), it is of course a mere stipulation.
(27) |{f ∈{λ(w,t).ιu[critical-value(smith)(w,t)(u) ∧ P (smith)(u) |
P ∈{bl-press, conc-chol, temperature}}| rise(w,t)(f)}|= 3
A second problem is constituted by what I call sets without roles.
(28) Three bodyguards (of Arnold) have changed.
As we are talking about the bodyguards of a particular person (namely Arnold), we
cannot distinguish bodyguards by whose unique bodyguard each of them is. Thus,
bodyguards are similar to critical values and different from temperatures. But we
cannot rely on there being identifying roles that they play with respect to the person
10Maybe those that Nathan (2005) treats as functions to degrees on scales instead of to individuals.
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they are bodyguard of, either. In that, bodyguards are unlike critical values and
cannot be treated along the lines of (27).
Nathan (2005) (cf. also Romero 2006) observes an interesting effect on the
interpretation of change that I will refer to as Nathan’s Puzzle. In my terminology,
it relates to the distinction between functional nouns and funktionenbu¨ndel on the
one hand, and sets without roles on the other. For (29a) to be true, the overall set of
pictures on Jordan’s wall has to change (set change SC), whereas for (29b), point-
wise change (within the set; PC) is sufﬁcient (that is, the overall set of governors
may stay the same, but they swap jobs among themselves).11
(29) a. The pictures on Jordan’s wall have changed.
b. Three governors have changed.
To sum up, my extension of Lasersohn’s solution within semantics proper fails
to account for two sorts of relational nouns in subject position (namely, funktio-
nenbu¨ndel and sets without roles). Moreover, we lack a solution to the interpretive
behaviour of change as constituted by Nathan’s puzzle. The original Montagovian
solution (backed up with a meaning postulate against outer index dependence), fares
well on the ﬁrst part of the problem but fails to account for Nathan’s puzzle.12
4. Individual Concepts as Elements of Conceptual Covers
4.1. Interrogation and Quantiﬁcation under Cover
Neither individual concepts from the lexicon nor individual concepts derived in
the course of the semantic derivation account for all the phenomena observed with
nouns in subject positions of intensional verbs. Therefore, I would like to go back
to the original motivation of individual concepts as identifying the individuals one
wants to talk about. A formal account of the idea that belief attribution, as well as
questioning and quantiﬁcation proceed with respect to mehods of identiﬁcation, is
provided in Aloni (2000).13 Although, at an index, common nouns denote sets of
individuals, we can identify them only under certain guises - that is, we need indi-
vidual concepts to pick out individuals. Aloni captures this in terms of conceptual
covers over the domain of individuals. In order to capture the semantics of change,
I deviate from her formulation by introducing temporality. I assume that the set of
11Nathan (2005) and Romero (2006) term the distinction ‘relational’ vs. ‘non-relational’. Since
they do not offer clear criteria for relationality, I stick to Barker’s (1995) individuation of relational
nouns as those that allow for of NP arguments (bodyguard of Arnold/∗tree of Arnold). Then, PC
vs. SC depends on how easily a ‘role’ reading is available instead of an ‘occupant’-reading. That
is, while both bodyguard and governor are relational, only governors are easily taken to fulﬁll a
particular ofﬁce each.
12Romero (2006), achieves an elegant solution in the Montagovian framework for examples with
deﬁnite descriptions. Nevertheless, as she herself points out, it cannot be generalized to (other)
quantiﬁcational determiners.
13I am indebted to Ede Zimmermann (p.c.) for drawing my attention to the potential relevance of
this body of work to the topic under investigation.
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intervals T comes with a partial order . The atomic parts (temporal instants) TA
form the (left) domain of the ordering A deﬁned by t′ At iff t′  t and there is
no t′′ s.t. t′′ = t′ and t′′  t′.
(30) Given a set of indices (pairs of worlds W and temporal instants TA) and a
universe of individuals D, a conceptual cover CC based on (W ×TA,D) is
a set of functions (W ×TA)→ D such that:
(∀(w,t) ∈W ×TA)(∀d ∈D)(∃!c ∈ CC)[c(w,t) = d]
A conceptual cover CC is thus a set of individual concepts that obeys two restric-
tions: (i) at each index, all individuals are picked out (existence), and (ii) at each
index, each individual is picked out by only one individual concept (uniqueness).
Which cover is salient depends on the contextual perspective. Consider (31).
Depending on the context of the conversation, on some occasions (31a) counts as
a good answer (e.g. at a history exam), on others (31b) does (e.g. at a cocktail
party where the interrogator might know perfectly well the name of the person she
is looking for).
(31) Who is the president of Mali?
a. Amadou Toumani Toure´. at a history exam
b. Him! (pointing at someone) at a cocktail reception
The contrast can be captured naturally if it is assumed that the partitioning induced
by a question (cf. Groenendijk and Stokhof 1984) is sensitive to the salient con-
ceptual cover. (31a) resolves the question if the naming cover (32a) is salient, and
(31b) does if a rigid cover is (32b) (K is the set of proper names):
(32) a. NC = {λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x is called a in w at t′]]| a ∈K} naming cover
b. RC = {λ(w,t).d | d ∈D} rigid cover, used in pointing
Under the assumption that individuals are accessed only with respect to a particu-
lar conceptual cover, quantiﬁcation, too, can be treated as sensitive to conceptual
covers. Even if, semantically, the restrictor denotes a set of individuals, the nuclear
scope predicate can be applied to the individual concepts used to pick them out. I
add the salient contextual cover F as a parameter of interpretation.14
I assume that change is true of an individual concept f in w at an interval t
iff t contains at least two points which are assigned different values by f .15
(33) [[change]](w,t)(f) = 1 iff ∃t′, t′ At:f(w,t′) = f(w,t′′).
F [w,t] is pointwise application of a set of functions F = {f1, . . . ,fn} to (w,t):
14This is a slight simpliﬁcation we can take since we are only concerned with sentences that are
interpreted w.r.t. one cover (at a time).
15Instead of the semantics in (9), rise is now also intepreted at an interval, e.g. as in (i):
(i) [[rise]](w,t)(f 〈s,e〉) = 1 iff f(left(t)) < f(right(t)), where left and right map a closed interval
onto its left and right boundary respectively.
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(34) F [w,t] := {f i(w,t) | f i ∈ F}
In general, quantiﬁcational determiners are interpreted as in (35a) (MOST/EVERY/3
stand for the 〈〈〈s,e〉, t〉,〈〈〈s,e〉, t〉, t〉〉 versions of the standard interpretations). That
is, they quantify over the elements in that part of the conceptual cover that picks out
the individuals constituting the extension of the restrictor predicate throughout the
reference interval. The extension of common nouns may change in the course of
the reference interval t, therefore, determiners force us to interpret them at each
instant within such an interval. I call a subset of a conceptual cover F that picks out
exactly the extension of a predicate P (at all atomic parts of an interval t) a P-cover
(for t).16 Now, three, for example, comes out as in (35b).
(35) a. [[most/every/three/. . . (w,t) ]]F (Q〈s,〈e,t〉〉)(P 〈〈s,e〉,t〉) = 1 iff
for the F 1 ⊆ F such that ∀t′ At: F 1[w,t′] = Q(w,t′):
MOST/EVERY/3/. . . (λf.f ∈ F 1)(λf.P (f))
b. [[three(w,t)]]F (Q〈s,〈e,t〉〉)(P 〈〈s,e〉,t〉) = 1 iff
for the F 1 ⊆ F such that ∀t′ At: F 1[w,t′] = Q(w,t′):
| {f i ∈ F 1 | P (f i)} |≥ 3
4.2. Accounting for Nathan’s Puzzle and Other Observations
We are now ready to explain the contrast between set change and pointwise change
as observed in (36) vs. (37):
(36) a. Three bodyguards changed.
b. Three pictures on Jordan’s wall have changed.
(37) Three mayors changed.
As discussed in Section 3.4, nouns like bodyguard or picture on the wall give rise to
set-change interpretations. I argue that this is the case because we tend to think of
them as individuals simpliciter and thus pick them out with a temporally constant
cover that is inapplicable to describe the relevant sets in the scenario of change.
A (subset of a) conceptual cover CC is temporally constant iff it does not contain
any individual concepts that for one and the same world assign different values at
different temporal instants:
(38) If CC is a cover, then F ⊆ CC is temporally constant iff for all f i ∈ F ,
w ∈W,t,t′ AT : f i(w,t) = f i(w,t′), else F is temporally variable.
(36a) is interpreted as true at (w,t) iff F 1, the part of the salient cover F that
describes the bodyguards throughout the reference interval t, contains at least three
individual concepts that assign different values to at least two instants within t:
(39) [[three(w,t)(λ(w,t).bodyguards(w,t)) change(w,t)]]F = 1 iff
for the F 1 ⊆ F such that
16Note that, for any P , a conceptual cover F will contain at most one P -cover. If it does not
contain one, interpretation with respect to that particular F fails.
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for all t′ At : F 1[w,t′] = [[bodyguard]]F (w,t′):
| {f i ∈ F 1 | ∃t
′, t′′ At : f i(w,t
′) = f i(w,t
′′)} |≥ 3
Assume that (36a) is interpreted in scenario like (40) where t consists of two subin-
tervals t′ followed by t′′, such that after t′, John, Peter and Mary are exchanged
against Simon, Susi and Sandro, while Sally remains as a bodyguard throughout
both parts of t. Intuitively, the sentence should be true under these circumstances.
(40) [[bodyguard]]F (w,t′) = {john, peter, mary, sally}
[[bodyguard]]F (w,t′′) = {simon, susi, sandro, sally}
Now, crucially, bodyguards or pictures on a wall tend to be perceived as sets of
individuals - we use either naming or pointing covers to individuate them. Both are
temporally constant.Therefore, neither the naming cover NC = {λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x
is called ‘john’ at (w,t′)]], λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x is called ‘peter’ at (w,t′)]],. . . }, nor
the rigid cover used in pointing contains a subset F 1 that describes the bodyguards
throughout t. Therefore, interpretation fails with respect to F . But since F is just
a matter of contextual salience, I assume that hearers try to envoke a more sensible
cover. To capture this, I adopt the the Principle of Cooperative Indentiﬁcation.
(41) Principle of Cooperative Identiﬁcation: Consider a quantiﬁed sentence p =
Q(R)(N), Q any quantiﬁcational determiner. If F contains no R-cover, then
[[p]]F = [[p]]F
′
, where F ′ is the next salient CC after F s.t. F ′ contains an
R-cover. If no CC salient in the context contains an R−cover, [[p]]F = 1 iff
[[p]]F
′
= 1 for each arbitrary CC F ′ that contains an R−cover.
Considering all possibilities of arbitrarily aligning the individuals in the restrictor’s
denotation amounts to supervaluation over all ways to describe the set of body-
guards throughout the reference interval. Our case involves four individuals, the
sentence thus has to be true w.r.t. 4! types of arbitrary conceptual covers (variation
on non-bodyguard individuals is ignored as irrelevant). Since three of the body-
guards get exchanged, none of these 24 covers can contain more than one individual
concept that does not change from t′ to t′′ (the only candidate is λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x is
called ‘sally’ at (w,t′)]]). But if fewer than three bodyguards are exchanged, some
arbitrary alignments will contain less than three changing individual concepts and
will falsify the sentence. Therefore, the sentence can only be true if the set changes
by the indicated amount.
Let us now look at mayors. In contrast to bodyguards or pictures, they easily
give rise to temporally variable conceptual covers. Often, we think of mayors not
just as the individuals who happen to be mayor at a certain point in time, but in terms
of their particular job. Therefore, change in the set can be irrelevant, as long as there
is pointwise change with respect to the functions we have used to individuate the
individuals in question. Mayors render salient either the naming cover NC, or a job
cover depending on cities. Both can serve to identify the individuals who are mayor
at a particular point of time.
(42) NC = {λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x is called ‘klaus’ at (w,t′)]], λ(w,t).ιx[∃t′[x is called
‘petra’ at (w,t′)]],. . . }
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(43) JC = {λ(w,t).ιu[mayor-of-frankfurt(w,t)(u)], λ(w,t).ιu[mayor-of-berlin(w,t)(u)],. . . }
Consider (44) at (w,t), where Klaus and Petra simply exchange their cities, without
there being a change in the overall set of mayors.
(44) [[two(w,t)(λ(w,t).mayors(w,t)) changed(w,t) ]]F = 1 iff
for the F 1 ⊆ F such that ∀t′ At : F 1[w,t′] = [[mayor]]F (w,t′):
| {f i ∈ F 1 | ∃t
′, t′′ At : f i(w,t
′) = f i(w,t
′′)} |≥ 2
Consider the table in (45). If the job cover is salient (that is, F = JC), the sentence
comes out as true. Therefore, pointwise change is normally sufﬁcient. But if for
some reason the naming cover is more salient, the sentence in (44) comes out as
false. And indeed, speakers tend to judge it as false in a scenario which forces
interest in the bare individuals (e.g. which politicians should get invited to an annual
BBQ).
(45) mayors at (w,t), where t consists of t′ followed by t′′:
JC NC
mayorFrankfurt mayorStuttgart Klaus Petra
(w,t′) klaus petra petra klaus
(w,t′′) klaus petra klaus petra
We are now able to account for common nouns with 〈e, t〉-denotations as restrictors
of quantiﬁers in intensional argument positions, and also for Nathan’s Puzzle. The
solution is inherently pragmatic: Interpretation depends on the perspective taken
on the individuals in the context. But is such a pragmatic solution strong enough
to account for the temperature paradox? Consider ﬁrst the premise of the fallacy
where the intensional interpretation of the subject noun phrase has to come in (46).
(46) The temperature is rising.
To interpret this, we have to ﬁrst saturate the free variable, and interpret temperature
as temperature of a contextually salient location. The truth conditions with respect
to the contextually salient cover F are now computed as follows:
(47) [[the(w,t)(λ(w,t).temperature(w,t)(x)) rise(w,t)]]g,F (w,t) = 1 iff for
the F 1 ⊆F such that ∀t′ At: F 1[w,t′] = [[temperature]]g,F (w,t′)(g(x)):
| F 1 |= 1 and ∀f i ∈ F 1 : f i ∈ [[rise]]g,F (w,t).
But shouldn’t this enable us to understand (48) as saying that the temperature of
Frankfurt is rising, provided that temperatures are picked out as for (47), and the
actual temperature of Frankfurt is known to be 90?
(48) Ninety is rising.
At ﬁrst glance, this may look like a knock-down argument against the pragmatic
solution, but, at second glance, it even provides a strong argument in its favour.
Crucially, (48) does not contain a determiner, and the solution I am advocating
relies on a determiner to introduce sensitivity to covers. Compare (49):17
17The facts were ﬁrst pointed out to me by Felix Schumann (p.c.) for German. I am also indebted
to Samson Tikitu de Jager for bringing to my attention that the same facts hold in English.
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(49) The temperature in Ede’s ofﬁce is already 32 degrees and I think
a. . . . ∗(the) 32 degrees will certainly increase.
b. . . . ∗(that) 32 degrees is going up by mid-afternoon.
If a particular value has been introduced in relation to a temperature function, refer-
ence to that temperature function is possible by a deﬁnite description that uses the
name of the value as the descriptive part. That is, 32 degrees refers to the individual
directly, but a cover containing λ(w,t).the-temp.-in-Ede’s-ofﬁce(w,t) is used when
evaluating the 32 degrees. Since λ(w,t).the-temp.-in-Ede’s-ofﬁce(w,t) need not be
temporally constant, (49) is felicitous and can be true.
While (48) and (49) corroborate the analysis that determiners are responsi-
ble for bringing in individual concepts, Maribel Romero (p.c.) points out (50) as
problematic: As I translate temperature as type 〈s,〈e, t〉〉, (50) seems to pair rise
with a variable of type e inside the relative clause.
(50) Most temperatures that haven’t risen in a long time are rising now.
Under the traditional head-external construal of relative clauses, (most) tempera-
tures is generated outside the relative clause. The relative clause contains an op-
erator trace of type e and as a whole, expresses a 〈e, t〉 predicate ﬁt to restrict the
external head temperature. But Saﬁr (1999) argues convincingly that reconstruc-
tion (and, hence, a copy inside of the relative clause) is necessary to explain the
parallel behaviour of external heads and relative clause operator phrases with re-
spect to reconstruction effects.18 Thus, a head-external analysis along the lines of
(51b) is excluded. The LFs claimed to be available instead are interpretable under
the typing I propose. The relevant copy of the external head temperatures is the
one that appears as the complement of the relative clause predicate (cf. 51a). Even
for 〈e, t〉-predicates, interpretation would fail. To render the structure interpretable,
Fox (2002) proposes trace conversion as an operation at LF. The process inserts a
deﬁnite determiner in front of the relative clause internal (‘reconstructed’) copy of
temperatures. Its index is interpreted as identity with the variable abstracted over,
which by Predicate Modiﬁcation restricts this lower copy of temperature.
(51) a. most [ temperatures [ that are rising ]]
b. most [ temperatures λ x.rise(w,t)(x) ]
c. most [ temperatures [ λ x [ the λ y[temperature(y) & x = y ]]]]
Translation and interpretation for (51c) are given in (52). Note that to capture rela-
tive clauses, we have to allow the index of the predicate in the relative clause to be
interpreted with respect to the matrix clause. Under the only sensible interpretation,
it is not bound by the index binder arising in quantiﬁction.19
18Roughly, quantiﬁers in argument but not in adjunct position of either external heads and operator
phrases of relative clauses give rise to secondary crossover effects.
19Otherwise, individual concepts would have to rise at a temporal instant, which is inconsistent
with the semantics adopted for rise. Technically, this requires a reﬁned treatment of world and time
variables as offered e.g. by Percus (2000). He also provides a natural starting point for exploring
what the constraints are in these cases.
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(52) [[[most(w,t)λ(w,t′)[temperatures(w,t′)
λy[that [the λ(w,t′′) temperature(w,t′′) x] rise(w,t)] ]]]]F =
λQ.for the F 1 ⊆ F : ∀t′ At : F 1[w,t′] = λy.[[temperature]]F (w,t′)(y) and
the F 2⊆F : ∀t′′At′ :F 2[w,t′′] =λx.[[temperature]]F (w,t′′)(x) and x = y:
|F 2 | = 1 and ∀f ∈F 2 : [[rise]]F (w,t)(f): MOST(λf.f ∈F 1)(λf.Q(f)).
In (52), we quantify over that cover part F 1 that at all instants within t picks out
those temperatures x such that the individual concept that picks out x at that instant
is rising at the reference interval (w,t). This seems to be the correct reading.
The pragmatic analysis also squares well with the amount of context de-
pendence observed in whether a noun receives a set-change or a point-wise change
interpretation. Although pictures on Jordan’s wall has a strong tendency to be in-
terpreted as inducing set-change, some speakers argue that they could also think
of pictures in terms of their positions in Jordan’s room (the picture closest to the
window, the picture above the bed, the picture just left of the door,. . . ), and in that
case, get an interpretation of pointwise change. The same holds for bodyguards: if
each of them has a ﬁxed responsibility (e.g. one guards the back door, one takes
care of the car,. . . ), then all of a sudden pointwise change becomes available. This
volatility is entirely expected under the pragmatic account, but hard to capture if
individual concepts come from the lexicon. Nevertheless, it is far from trivial to
predict what conceptual cover(s) is/are salient in a given situation. Aloni (2005)
constitutes the most elaborate attempt to provide a stringent formal pragmatic ac-
count to determine which conceptual cover is actually used in a particular context.
The approach is couched in bi-directional OT and makes quite good predictions.
Yet, it is acknowledged that it does not capture all scenarios considered.
5. A Problem for Temperatures as Individuals
For the examples considered so far, the pragmatic solution seems to make the right
predictions. Let us now consider an ambiguity that, while providing further corrob-
oration at ﬁrst glance, turns out to be highly problematic.
(53) The lowest temperature is rising.
On one reading (call it the city reading), the sentence is true of a scenario where
we are interested in the temperatures of three cities, e.g. Frankfurt, New York, and
Amsterdam. Then, (53) is true if the city that happens to have the lowest tem-
perature at the moment of evaluation is such that its temperature is rising (conse-
quently, it might soon cease to be the coldest place). On the other reading (call
it the ranking reading), the sentence is true of a scenario where we are recording
the temperatures of maybe different cities every day and realize that from day to
day, the lower boundary of our measurements is going up (providing evidence for
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theories of global warming).20 The ambiguity is highly reminiscent of an example
Heim (1979) discusses for concealed questions. (54) is ambiguous between a plain
reading where John and Fred (maybe without being aware of each other’s existence
even) are able to answer the same price-question, and a higher order reading, where
John is able to indicate which price-question Fred is able to answer (without maybe
John himself being able to answer that price-question).
(54) John knows the price Fred knows.
Heim observes that the existence of the higher order reading constitutes a serious
problem for a pragmatic solution to concealed questions in terms of de re-attribution
of a property to an individual (cf. Heim 1979, Frana 2006; Schwager 2007 for a
recent attempt to remedy that problem). In contrast, Romero (2005) obtains an el-
egant solution for (54) by using both individual concepts coming from the lexicon
and individual concepts resulting as intensions of deﬁnite descriptions. Indepen-
dently of the problem the pragmatic theory of concealed questions faces with the
ambiguity in (54), at ﬁrst glance, the pragmatic access to individual concept seems
to work perfectly for the ambiguity in (53). We expect to obtain the city reading, if
the salient conceptual cover looks like (55a), and the ranking reading if the salient
cover contains the denotation of the subject noun phrase and looks like (55b).
(55) a. city-cover = {λ(w,t).the-temp.-of-Frankfurt(w,t),
λ(w,t).the-temp.-of-Amsterdam(w,t), λ(w,t).the-temp.-of-NY(w,t)}
b. ranking-cover = {λ(w,t).the-highest-temp.(w,t),
λ(w,t).the-2nd-highest-temp.(w,t), λ(w,t).the-lowest-temp.(w,t)}
But now, assume that, at some index, two cities happen to have the same tempera-
ture index. Consider (56):
(56) Three temperatures are rising.
According to my pragmatic solution, we ﬁrst collect all abstract degree individu-
als that are temperatures (of an object in a contextually given set) for the index of
evaluation (w,t). Then, we have to establish a suitable conceptual cover for this set
of individuals and check if three individual concepts within that cover are rising at
(w,t). Therefore, if at (w,t), the temperature of Frankfurt is the same as the tem-
perature of New York (e.g. 20C), a suitable conceptual cover should contain only
one individual concept to pick out these 20C. And, due to uniqueness, (55a) does
not consitute a conceptual cover of these abstract degree individuals. But this runs
counter to our intuitions: we want to simply count cities with rising temperatures
and ignore whether two of them are at the exactly same level at the point of interest.
In contrast, the ranking reading is indeed blind to the fact how many cities instan-
tiate a certain value. (53) is still felicitous under the ranking reading if the lowest
temperature measured is displayed by two cities. If individuation by city is the only
cover available, (53) results in a presupposition failure.
20Note that the two readings are truly independent: the ranking reading entails the city reading
only if we are measuring the same cities’ temperatures every day.
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Currently, the only solution I can think of is to reconsider what tempera-
tures actually are. We make the right predictions for the city reading if temperature
individuals are concrete events (like tropes in the sense of e.g. Moltmann 2004).
Nevertheless, for the ranking reading, we have to retain temperature individuals as
abstract values. At ﬁrst glance it might seem implausible that there are now two
levels at which pragmatics inﬂuences quantiﬁcation: on the one hand, it is sensitive
to how we pick out the individuals in question, but on the other hand, it is also sen-
sitive to what are individuals in the ﬁrst place, and, moreover, these two issues are
not independent. Nevertheless, the second kind of dependence is found in purely
extensional contexts, too. Consider counting ambiguities as recently discussed in
detail by Asher (2007).
(57) a. Julie mastered every book in the library.
b. Julie carried off every book in the library.
While (57a) tends to count types of books, (57b) tends to count individual copies.
In this case it is the predicate that determines the granularity of counting. For (53),
both granularities seem to be ﬁne, but the granularity seems to go hand in hand with
what constitute possible covers. At this point, I can only leave the issue for future
research. But I am optimistic that a better understanding of counting puzzles like
(57) and the salience of particular conceptual covers will go together to enlighten
these problems for the pragmatic solution.
6. Conclusions
I have argued that function readings for nouns like temperature or mayor depend on
how we individuate individuals that are temperatures and mayors at the indices of
interest. This provides a solution to classical problems like the temperature-paradox
and, without meaning postulates, avoids multiplicity of such functions across in-
dices. Moreover, it explains why change is normally interpreted pointwise with
nouns like mayor, but setwise with bodyguards (Nathan’s puzzle). The dependence
of the effect on the utterance context is captured naturally. Nevertheless, the interde-
pendence of particular covers and what count as individuals of a certain type, is still
ill understood, as well as the question what determines what conceptual cover(s)
are salient.
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